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The bad news, however, is that despite
receiving a clear mandate from the elec-
torate and freeing themselves of the menace
of Jayalalitha, Vajpayee and Sinha have
been timid in their approach. The clearest
signal coming out of the budget is that
political stability is irrelevant when it comes
to the pace of economic reforms in India.
Our fate is to continue to muddle through
the reforms, chipping inefficiencies here
and there but never chopping them off in
big chunks. Every so often, we may still
achieve a 7 to 8 per cent annual rate of
growth but we are unlikely to hit double-
digit growth rates – rates that are well within
our grasp under bolder policy actions.
Thus, my dissatisfaction with the bud-
get stems principally from the failure of
the Vajpayee government to use the
occasion to launch broader and bolder
long-term reforms. In the recent past, when
the coalition governments were fragile,
the absence of such a strategy was expli-
cable: even the tiniest group within the
coalition carried the power to veto any
policy change. But now the National
Democratic Alliance is virtually guaran-
teed its full five-year term and, with the
Congress Party in total disarray, highly
likely to win another term. Why, then,
does the budget have the appearance of
the same old annual exercise in which
finance ministers practise the art of
offering minimal policy changes neces-
sary to maintain their image as reformers?
Why is there no attempt on the part of
Sinha to use the first budget of the five-
year-plus mandate as the launch pad for
a programme that would take India to its
deserved status of a mature economy by
the year 2010?
In the following, I discuss the budget
under six major headings: fiscal deficit,
tax policy changes, food and fertiliser
subsidies, privatisation and voluntary
separation schemes, small-scale industries
and banking. As far as possible, in each
case, I assess the changes announced in
the budget and comment on what needs to
be done if India is to achieve the status of
a mature economy in the foreseeable future.
Fiscal Deficit
Let us begin at the traditional starting
point – the budget deficit. This is the
subject that has generated most heat in the
press though often without much light.
Fiscal deficit, which measures the borrow-
ing and other liabilities the government
must incur to bridge the gap between total
expenditures and receipts from tax and non-
tax revenues and loan receipts, is estimated
to be 5.1 per cent of the GDP for the year
2000-01. This comes on the heels of equally
large deficits under Sinha in the preceding
two years: 5.1 per cent in 1998-99 and 5.6
per cent in 1999-2000. By comparison,
annual deficits during 1995-98 had been
4.1, 4 and 4.7 per cent in that chronological
order.1
Commentators in the Indian press have
given much grief to Sinha for the high
deficit. Oddly, with rare exceptions, they
have themselves failed to suggest ways in
which the deficit could have been held at
substantially lower levels, say, between 3
and 4 per cent of the GDP. Some sugges-
tions have been made but they do not
amount to so much as half per cent of the
GDP and carry disproportionately large
political risks. Indeed, Rakesh Mohan,
who confronted the issue frontally, con-
cluded that “there is no magical remedy
to improving the country’s fiscal situation
overnight.”2
At the outset, one may ask whether
deficits of 5 to 6 per cent should neces-
sarily worry us; could it be that we are
overreacting? Some may view the mere
mention of this question as an act of ir-
responsibility. But consider just two facts.
In the last year, despite the whopping 5.6
per cent fiscal deficit, at 4 per cent, our
inflation rate has been remarkably low
even by our own hard-to-match historical
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n two short years,” concluded
Yashwant Sinha in his budget
speech, “we have sent notice to the
world that India will be an economic super-
power in the 21st century”. That was a little
too fast on the part of Sinha. For the notice
he actually sent in the two long hours he
spoke was that the world had better wait
till the 22nd century for India to arrive –
and count on China to fill the gap. At the
pace Sinha has set for himself in this budget,
it may take more than two generations to
complete the second-generation reforms.
To be sure, there is much in the budget
for which Sinha deserves commendation.
Leaving the nuances and qualifications
aside for the moment, consider the list of
the announcements he has made to ad-
vance the cause of the second-generation
reforms: rationalisation of indirect taxes,
plans to bring services into the tax net,
increase in the dividend tax, reduction in
the highest tariff rate, reduction in and
eventual elimination of tax exemption on
export earnings, reduction in fertiliser and
food subsidies, plans to bring down the
government’s share in equity to 26 per
cent in most public-sector enterprises and
to 33 per cent in public-sector banks, reduc-
tion in inequities in the tax and regulatory
treatments of venture capital in relation to
mutual funds, and a variety of procedural
simplifications. These announcements give
ample evidence of continued commitment
to economic reforms on the part of Sinha
and the Vajpayee government.
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most inputs and machinery and will be
rebated in full to firms purchasing these
items. But many goods, mainly consisting
of final goods, are subject to an additional
special excise duty that can be applied at
three different rates of 8, 16 and 24 per cent.
The special excise duty cannot be rebated.
As Govinda Rao has pointed out, in
terms of real impact, these changes are
largely symbolic.5 To quote him, “The over-
all rates are likely to change only margin-
ally, and this is particularly true of com-
modities facing the 24 per cent special
excise duty”. The danger is that the state govern-
ments may emulate the central government
by levying a VAT at a single rate and
special sales taxes at multiple rates.
Therefore, the main benefit from the
CENVAT is likely to accrue in terms of
administrative simplification and the con-
sequent reduction in tax disputes. Sinha
has made an extra effort in this regard by
promising to replace what he called “the
plethora of existing rules” by a small set
of simple and transparent rules. He has
also promised to dispense with all statu-
tory records in excise and to require the
excise department to rely upon the
manufacturer’s records. For valuation
purposes, the existing concept of ‘normal
price’ is to be replaced by the ‘transaction
value’. These are important changes that
will give tax assessees a measure of relief
from the bureaucratic stranglehold. But
Sinha also needs to devise mechanisms to
make the excise department more account-
able. A large proportion of the existing
disputes are the direct result of the excise
department’s refusal to honour the deci-
sions of the courts and filing of appeals
when none is warranted.6
A number of changes have been made
with respect to direct taxes. The one-by-six
taxation scheme has been extended from
the existing 54 cities to an additional 79
cities in the country. All cities with a popula-
tion of 2 lakh or more are now covered by
this scheme. This scheme has been a key
factor in raising the number of taxpayers
from 1 crore in 1996-97 to 2 crore currently.
The surcharge on personal income tax
has been raised from 10 to 15 per cent.
For those in the 30 per cent tax bracket,
this is an increase of 1.5 per cent in their
tax burden. Thrown in with this tax in-
crease is the tax rebate of Rs 5,000 for
women taxpayers along with an increase
in the rebate to senior citizens from the
current level of Rs 10,000 to Rs 15,000.
Various exemptions currently available
in calculating the Minimum Alternate Tax
standards. And faster growth has brought
down our debt-to-GDP ratio from 65
per cent in 1993-94 to 56.6 per cent
in 1998-99. If we continue to grow at
current rates, this ratio will decline further.
Indeed, in a provocative article entitled
‘Ponzi Gambles Work: The Big Picture’,
T T Ram Mohan states that the probability
of a Ponzi gamble (i e, raising more debt
to payoff interest) failing is approximately
18 per cent for India.3
I should confess to having no real ex-
pertise in macroeconomics: this is an area
that has often eluded me. But, like most
others, I prefer to err on the side of caution.
That translates into a concern for a high
proportion of the total expenditure being
devoted to interest payments on the public
debt. These payments stand at 30 per cent
of total expenditures currently and must
be met by cutting other important public
expenditures, levying higher taxes or run-
ning larger deficits. No matter how one
solves the problem, investment and, hence,
growth is likely to be affected adversely.
What Sinha needs to do is think long-
term on this problem. The key question is
whether the current debt-to-GDP ratio
needs to be brought down. If not, let him
say so and confront his detractors head
on. If yes, he must decide by how much
the ratio should be brought down and how
to achieve this goal over a period of, say,
five years. Gestures like zero-budget fi-
nancing in eight departments, leading to
the discontinuation or merger of 69
schemes, will simply not deliver. Simi-
larly, the reduction in the interest rate from
12 to 11 per cent on General Provident
Funds is a step in the right direction but
grossly insufficient.
Tax Policy Changes
The finance minister has introduced a
number of changes in this area that must
be applauded. Indeed, for some of these
changes, he has been wrongly criticised in
the press.
Take trade taxes first. The peak custom
duty has been brought down from 40 to
35 per cent. This is clearly a step in the
right direction. When the Rao government
left office, the peak tariff rate was 50 per
cent. In 1997-98, Chidambaram brought
this rate down to 40 per cent but slapped
a 5 per cent across-the-board Special
Custom Duty. In 1998-99, Sinha added a
Special Additional Duty (SAD) that
amounted to 6 per cent in the case of goods
subject to the peak rate. Last year, Sinha
let Chidambram’s Special Custom Duty
run out but introduced a 10 per cent sur-
charge on the custom duty. For goods
subject to the peak custom duty, this
surcharge amounted to 4 per cent. Thus,
taking the 6 per cent SAD into account,
the effective peak custom duty became 50
per cent. This was precisely the rate ap-
plicable in the last year of the Rao govern-
ment! The 5-percentage points reduction
in the peak tariff rate in the current budget
finally moves tariff reform forward. Its
beneficial impact is likely to be reinforced
by the recent WTO ruling that forces the
government to abolish licensing on 1,429
items, which are mostly consumer goods
and subject to the peak rate.
Sinha has also decided to phase out the
income tax exemption for exporters in five
years. In the WTO parlance, this exemp-
tion is an export subsidy and, in principle,
subject to being countervailed. With our
per capita income below $ 1,000, we have
some flexibility in dodging countervailing
duties by our trading partners but this
flexibility is limited. As such, sooner or
later, our trading partners were bound to
challenge the exemption in the WTO.
But even leaving aside this risk, in my
judgment, Sinha showed great courage and
good economic sense in opting to phase
out the exemption. On national welfare
grounds, exports subsidies have even less
justification than tariffs. Why should our
taxpayers subsidise the consumers in other
countries since ultimately it is they who
will benefit from the subsidy through lower
prices of our exports? 4
Some commentators have argued that
the withdrawal of the exemption will affect
our exports adversely. These commenta-
tors need to remind themselves that any
encouragement to exports should come
through the exchange rate rather than tax
exemptions or export subsidies. Indeed, it
is regrettable that such technology giants
as Wipro, Infosys and Satyam Computers
will be able to maintain their exemption
for some time longer. Under a separate rule
in the Income Tax Act of India, software
units located in the Software Technology
Parks of India (STPI) are exempt from
income tax for 10 years from the day of
commencement of operations. Most of the
big software companies are located in one
of the 14 STPIs.
Turning to domestic indirect taxes next,
Sinha has decided to replace the multiple
Modified Value Added Tax (MODVAT)
system by a single, Central Value Added
Tax (CENVAT) rate of 16 per cent. This
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(MAT) have been eliminated. To compen-
sate for this, the tax rate has been reduced
to 7.5 per cent of the ‘book profits’ from
the current effective rate of 10.5 per cent.
The MAT has been extended uniformly to
all zero-tax companies. The only remain-
ing exception applies to exporters who
remain free from this tax.
The tax to be paid by corporations on
the dividend they distribute and by debt
oriented Mutual Funds and UTI on the
income they distribute has been raised
from 10 to 20 per cent. On the other hand,
banks and financial institutions have been
given a reprieve from the 2 per cent interest
tax they currently pay. Also, venture capi-
tal funds have been given some breaks that
remove inequities they suffered vis-a-vis
mutual funds.
Virtually all the changes in tax policy
Sinha has made are defensible in view of
the need for simplification and raising
revenues. Some giveaways such as the tax
rebate to women taxpayers and the in-
crease in tax rebate to senior citizens may
be criticised on grounds of revenue loss
in the wake of tight fiscal conditions but
these are small potatoes and, moreover,
Sinha is entitled to a few goodwill gestures.
The real problem with the tax proposals
is that they appear ad hoc, lacking a sense
of the long-term direction. For instance,
suppose the goal is, as it should be, to bring
all custom duties down to 10 per cent or
less by the year 2010. Even making the
assumption that such liberalisation will
significantly increase the imports-to-GDP
ratio and that many of the existing duty
exemptions will be eliminated, the reduction
in tariff rates will lead to a substantial decline
in customs duties as a proportion of the
total tax revenue. Are we realigning the
other direct and indirect taxes in a way that
they will be able to compensate this rev-
enue loss? Or is the plan to continue to
realign the tax rates every year depending
on the needs of that particular year?
Likewise, where are we headed with other
indirect taxes? Should we not be moving
to a genuine value added tax? After all, what
is the rationale for rebating taxes on some
items but not others? If the objective is to
move towards a genuine value added tax
at a single rate, why go through the current
circuitous route of the CENVAT and
special excise duties? Why not go directly
to a single VAT rate properly calibrated
to yield the requisite amount of revenue?
And what do we want to do with the
sectors that are entirely out of the tax net,
namely, services and agriculture? Sinha
has stated in his budget speech that he is
setting up an expert group on the taxation
of services. This is a very welcome announce-
ment but he needs to move faster. Further-
more, how are we to interpret his silence
on agriculture? Is it to be understood that
agriculture will stay out of the tax net in
perpetuity? If so, what is the rationale for
taxing a factory worker earning Rs 75,000
even in the face of high urban cost of living
but not a farmer earning even hundred
times that amount? In an economy where
we are now airlifting a million dollars
worth of roses to the Netherlands on
Valentine Day, farming is not necessarily
just a poor man’s source of livelihood.
Food and Fertiliser Subsidies
The reduction in and eventual elimina-
tion of food and fertiliser subsidies, which
account for nearly 10 per cent of non-plan
expenditures on the revenue account, has
been a vexed issue since the beginning of
reforms in 1991. Successive governments
have got nowhere with cutting them. Sinha
himself tried and failed to raise the price of
urea by so much as Re 1 per kilogram when
he presented his first budget. This time,
he appears to have made significant pro-
gress (assuming he is not forced to roll back
once more) and deserves kudos for it.
On food subsidies, the finance minister
has gone for increasing the benefits to
families below the poverty line (BPL) and
essentially easing out households above
the poverty line (APL). He has doubled the
allocation of foodgrains to BPL families
from 10 to 20 kilograms and set the price
at 50 per cent of the economic cost. As a
consequence, prices per kilogram facing
these families will rise from Rs 2.50 to
Rs 4.20 for wheat and from Rs 3.50 to
Rs 5.89 for rice. In the case of sugar, the
price hike is from Rs 12 to Rs 13 per kg.7
For APL families, the price of foodgrains
has been fixed at economic cost and, hence,
double of the corresponding price facing
BPL families. Moreover, income tax asses-
sees will no longer be entitled to a sugar
allocation from the public distribution
system (PDS).
These are all welcome changes. Though
the prices faced by the BPL families have
been raised, the increased allocation of
foodgrains will more than make up for it.
They can easily recover the increased
expenditure on the original 10 kilograms
by selling the new 10 kilograms at the
market price. Furthermore, the increase in
the price of foodgrains for APL families
to economic cost will effectively pull them
out of the PDS altogether. There is no reason
for them to go to the PDS if they can buy
foodgrains in the private market at similar
prices. Since these families account for as
much as 40 per cent of total PDS disburse-
ments while leakage accounts for another
30 per cent, we can look forward to a sub-
stantial shrinkage of the system.8 In turn,
this will lead to increased pressure on the
government to do something about the
bloated bureaucracy and wastage in the
Food Corporation of India, an issue from
which Sinha has shied away in this budget.
Fertiliser is a more complicated story.
Here, as the finance minister himself noted,
the real beneficiaries of the subsidy are
fertiliser producers rather than farmers.
Under the Retention Price Scheme (RPS)
for nitrogenous fertilisers, the government
assesses and underwrites the cost of pro-
duction for every single fertiliser factory.
Farmers, on the other hand, pay a fixed
price that is well below what would be
necessary to cover the costs. Govern-
ment subsidy fills the gap. Increases in
the subsidy are essentially the outcome
of increases in the costs of production
of fertiliser.9
It is evident that under RPS, fertiliser
producers have no incentive to improve
efficiency: a reduction in the cost results
in exactly equal reduction in the subsidy.
Therefore, there is no solution to the prob-
lem short of scrapping the RPS and forcing
fertiliser producers to face competition
from imports and each other while letting
the price facing farmers to be aligned to the
world price. There may be a case for gradual
phasing in of these policies but not for
a different eventual outcome. Some com-
mentators argue for maintaining a genuine
fertiliser subsidy to farmers so as to ensure
food security. But in my view, this is a
mistake. Even if we wish to encourage
food production beyond what will obtain
at world prices, a policy I do not endorse,
the first best intervention is a higher
support price for foodgrains rather than
subsidy on a specific input such as fertiliser.
Sinha has not taken this course, how-
ever. Rather than begin scrapping the RPS,
he has raised the urea price facing farmers
by 15 per cent. Assuming the price paid
by farmers is below the world price cur-
rently, this is a defensible move, at least
on efficiency grounds. But it is hardly a
solution to the problem of fertiliser sub-
sidy. Sinha needs to start cleaning the RPS
so that, by 2010 if not sooner, we have the
same regime in the fertiliser sector as in
other sectors.Economic and Political Weekly March 4, 2000 758
Privatisation and VSS
While the Vajpayee government has
undoubtedly speeded up the reforms in
this important area, the process remains
piecemeal and actions half-hearted. The
finance minister has announced his clear
intention to bring down the government
equity in all non-strategic public sector
units (PSUs) to 26 per cent or lower. This
is clearly a vast improvement over the past
approach whereby governments had been
often reluctant to disinvest to the point that
the management will pass into private hands.
At the same time, Sinha has not defined
which PSUs are non-strategic so that one
wonders how many PSUs will actually
qualify for 74 per cent disinvestment. Will
the units being successfully restructured
go on sale in the near future? And what
is the target date for the completion of the
privatisation process and other restructur-
ing? Specifically, does the finance minister
plan the exit of the government from manu-
facturing activity except in well-defined,
truly strategic areas by the year 2010?
It has been recognised for some time that
the resources under the National Renewal
Fund are insufficient to meet the cost of
Voluntary Separation Scheme (VSS) for
PSUs that are too sick to be revived and
must, consequently, be closed down. These
PSUs have assets, which can be used for
funding VSS. Sinha has promised to put
in place mechanisms to raise resources
from the market against the security of
these assets and to use the proceeds to
provide safety nets to workers.
While this is clearly a welcome step that
had been overdue for some time, the problem
of sick industries cannot disappear for good
until labour laws are reformed. This is a
sacred cow that no one seems to be willing
to touch. Yet, the absence of labour laws
that allow the hiring and firing of workers
on judicious terms serves the interests of
neither the firms nor workers. The current
laws on layoffs by firms with 100 or more
workers impossible constitute a formidable
barrier to the entry of new large-scale esta-
blishments. At the same time, workers in
smaller establishments and unorganised
sector have virtually no rights. One also
wonders what will happen to workers when
more of the existing firms with 100 or more
workers become sick. Will the government
have any option other than adding them to
the rolls of VSS at the taxpayer’s expense?
Small-Scale Industries
Sinha has announced some additional
credit facilities for small-scale industries
(SSI). The Reserve Bank of India (RBI)
had recently dispensed with the collateral
requirement for loans up to Rs1 lakh to
small units. Sinha has raised this limit to
Rs 5 lakhs. A credit guarantee scheme for
SSI enterprises is also being launched with
the provision for Rs 100 crore in the budget.
These are essentially giveaways that one
can digest on grounds of promoting small
entrepreneurs provided Sinha would also
face up to the reality that the SSI sector
is as much in need of being subject to
competition as the large-scale industries
were back in the the1980s and before. It
has been nearly three years since the Small
Enterprises Committee, led by its dynamic
chairman Abid Hussain, recommended
unequivocally that reservation of products
for the small-scale sector must be totally
abolished. The committee found the reser-
vation so counter-productive that it even
ruled out a phased abolition of it. The
committee noted that reservation had ham-
pered the growth of important sectors like
light engineering and food processing and
also exports from sectors like textiles and
leather where India was unable to supply
large volumes of quality products in time.
Like its predecessors, the Vajpayee
government has essentially refused to face
up to this reality. But looking the other way
will not make the problem go away. The
Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA) is due to
be phased out entirely on January 1, 2005.
When that happens and our small-scale
enterprises fail to compete against their
large-scale counterparts from China in the
US and European markets, we may have
a rude shock. Even more urgently, with
consumer goods imports about to be libera-
lised, the wall of protection the SSI enter-
prises have enjoyed in the reserved category
products is about to crumble. We can either
grant entry to our own large-scale enter-
prises now and survive or wait until prod-
ucts made by large-scale enterprises in
other countries enter our borders and parish.
Banking Sector
Banking sector is in dire need of reform
and the budget makes a modest beginning.
The most significant announcement is the
acceptance of the recommendations of the
Narasimham Committee on Banking Sector
Reforms for reducing the minimum
shareholding by the government in
nationalised banks to 33 per cent. Sinha
has made it clear, however, that this will
be done without loss of the public sector
control. He has also announced that he will
not close down any public sector bank.
In order to restrain the growth of fresh
non-performing assets, Sinha proposes to
create institutional mechanisms for shar-
ing of credit-related information on bor-
rowers and potential borrowers among
banks and financial institutions. Based on
the recommendation of an RBI Working
Group, a Credit Information Bureau will
soon be established.
Given the maze of distortions in the
banking sector, these announcements rep-
resent only a drop in the bucket. Space
constraints do not permit elaboration but
it may be stated that we have a very long
way to go before we can boast of a mature
banking sector. One key step the finance
minister could have taken to speed up the
reform process was to open the door to
foreign banks wider, perhaps by easing
regulations appropriately. Competitive
pressure from world-class producers helps
improve efficiency in the production of
not just goods but services as well. Let the
consumer taste the pleasures of modern
banking and he will demand the same from
local banks, private or public.
Concluding Remarks
There is no doubt that the millennium
budget carries forward the task of the
second-generation reforms. Its main dis-
appointment lies in the timid approach
the Vajpayee government has taken de-
spite the clear five-year mandate from
the electorate. If bold reforms are not
launched in the first two years of this term,
they are unlikely to be launched in the later
years. That will be sad for the nation and
its people.
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